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Abstract
Futures exchanges are in constant search of futures contracts that will generate a
profitable level of trading volume. In this context, it would be interesting to determine what
effect the introduction of new futures contracts have on the trading volume of the contracts
already listed. The introduction of new futures contracts may lead to a volume increase for
those contracts already listed and hence, contribute to the success of a futures exchange. On
the other hand, the introduction of new futures contracts could lead to a volume decrease for
the contracts already listed, thereby undermining the success of the futures exchange
accordingly. Using a multi-product hedging model in which the perspective has been shifted
from portfolio to exchange management, we study these effects. Using data from two
exchanges that are different regarding market liquidity (Amsterdam Exchanges versus
Chicago Board of Trade) we show the usefulness of the proposed tool. Our findings have
several important implications for a futures exchange’s innovation policy.
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3I. Introduction
In financial literature it is argued that the success of a futures contract is heavily dependent
on both its design and the characteristics of the underlying commodity’s spot market (Black
(1986)). Gray (1987) identifies the importance of contract design. He argues that a futures
contract must reflect the commercial movement of the commodity both closely and broadly
enough to avoid price distortions resulting from specifications in the futures contract. An
empirical study by Silber (1981) concludes that futures contracts whose specifications
closely reflect the needs of hedgers seem more likely to succeed. Tashjian and McConnell
(1989) show that hedging effectiveness is a very important determinant in explaining the
success of futures contracts. In accordance with these recent findings, particular attention
has been paid to hedging effectiveness. Author  who have proposed measures of hedging
effectiveness include Ederington (1979), Hsin, Kuo and Lee (1994), Chang, Chang and
Fang (1996) and Pennings and Meulenberg (1997). Common to all these measures is an
attempt to indicate the extent to which hedgers are able to reduce spot price risk by using
futures contracts. It has also been argued that the motivation for hedging is not to reduce
spot price risk of a single commodity but to reduce the residual risk of the firm (Anderson
and Danthine (1980), Rolfo (1980), Anderson and Danthine (1981), Zilcha and Broll
(1992)). This implies that it may be of interest to an exchange to add to the existing futures
contracts new ones that provide the hedger with the opportunity to cover the firm’s residual
risk. This raises an important theoretical and practical question for a futures exchange: is it
beneficial to add new futures contracts to those already listed? In this paper we address this
question by utilizing and then departing from a multi-product hedging model. In contrast to
4previous research in this area (e.g Anderson and Danthine (1981), Duffie and Jackson
(1989), Myers and Thompson (1989), Fackler and McNew (1993), Tashjian and Weissman
(1995)) we shift the perspective from portfolios to the exchange management. Based on a
multi-product model we establish a framework that derives the consequences of adding a
new futures contract for the optimal hedging ratios of the existing contracts and therewith
their trading volume. We show that the introduction of a new futures contract might indeed
increase the trading volume of the futures contracts already listed (i.e., reinforcement).
However, under certain conditions, the listing of a new futures contract could also lead to a
volume decrease for the existing futures contracts (i.e., cannibalism).
This paper applies a multi-product hedging model for a competitive producer who faces
both input and output price risks and whose only available hedging instruments are futures
contracts on these inputs and outputs. First, we focus on the optimal hedging ratio for a firm
with multiple hedging opportunities, i.e., the optimal portfolio of futures contracts to hedge
the residual risk of the firm. Second, we derive the conditions for futures contract
reinforcement. The managerial implications of our findings are demonstrated empirically,
using data from the Chicago Board of Trade on the soybean complex and data from the
Amsterdam Exchanges on financial futures taking liquidity costs into account.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present a multi-product hedging model,
while Section III is devoted to the analysis of reinforcement, assuming optimal multi-
product risk minimizing hedging. Section IV presents findings for the soybean complex
traded on the Chicago Board of Trade and for financial futures traded on the Amsterdam
5Exchanges, the latter being a relatively thin market. In Section V the managerial
implications of reinforcement for the futures exchange are discussed. Results and main
conclusions are summarized in SectionVI.
II. Multi-Product Hedging Model
The vast majority of investigations into the optimal hedging strategy for a risk-averse
competitive producer have focused on managing the risk of a single input or output in a
setting of price risk and in some cases also uncertain production (see, for example,
Ederington (1979), Rolfo (1980), Berck and Cecchetti (1985), Lapan and Moschini (1994)).
Many firms have multiple inputs and outputs, and it is therefore reasonable to assume the
firm to be interested in the protection of its over-all financial performance. Duffie and
Jackson (1989), Fackler and McNew (1993), Tashjian and Weissman (1995) among others
have extended earlier hedging models, using a multi-product hedging approach. They
consider the natural price variation of firms’ total inputs and outputs. We use such an
approach to derive the conditions under which the introduction of a new futures contract
leads to either a volume increase or decrease for those futures already listed.
Following the standard hedging literature (Anderson and Danthine (1981), Duffie and
Jackson (1989), Myers and Thompson (1989), Fackler and McNew (1993), Tashjian and
Weissman (1995)) suppose a firm has an endowment of n spot commodity positions. Let
b be a n vector of these quantities where positive elements represent long (buy) spot
positions and negative numbers are short (sell) spot positions. Let T be a m vec or of
6futures positions, again with positive (negative) numbers representing long (short)
positions. In this two-period model, the next period's spot prices S and the next period's
futures prices F are random vectors. Denoting the m vector of today's prices for future
delivery as f. Assume unbiased futures markets, or E(F) = f.1 The mean and variance of
next period's prices may be written:
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where ffS  is the matrix of covariances between the futures prices at maturity, Sss the
matrix of covariances between the spot prices and Ssf  the covariance matrix between spot
and futures prices. The firm's random profit P can be written as:
TfFC S= )'()(' -+-P bb (2)
where C(b) is the firm’s cost function.
                                                          
1 There is considerable empirical evidence support for this assumption (K mara (1982))
7The first-order condition for the variance-minimizing futures position T in terms of the
spot position b in a mean-variance framework, in which firms are assumed to maximize a
linear function that is increasing in expected returns and decreasing in return variance, is2:
.1 bfsffT SS-=
- (3)
The optimal hedge position can be described in terms of the fraction of the spot commodity
offset in the futures market. In such a case, the vector of hedge ratios can be written as:
bb fsffdiagHR SS=
-- 11)]([ (4)
where diag (b) is a diagonal matrix with vector b on its main diagonal. Hedge ratios can be
defined independent of spot commodities quantities, provided that the latter are always
held in fixed proportions, as is the case when they represent inputs and/or outputs for
some fixed proportions technology.
                                                          
2 For the conditions which justify the use of the mean-variance framework and a discussion of the
use of the mean-variance framework and the general expected utility model, see Pulley (1981),
Tew, et al. (1991), Coyle (1992), Meyer and Rasche (1992), Bigelow (1993) and Pope and
Chavas (1994).
8III. Reinforcement versus Cannibalism
One advantage of the multi-product hedging approach outlined above over the single-
product approach is its incorporation of correlation between spot prices. In fact, the multi-
product hedging model incorporates not only the direct relationships, but also the cross
relationships (the relationship between spot price A and futures price B) and the indirect
relationships (the relationship between spot price A and futures price B through futures
price A). This characteristic may be helpful in gaining insight into the effects of adding new
types of futures contracts to those already listed. When adding a new futures contract, the
following effects can be discerned: 1) Demand (reflected in the hedged portion of the firms’
endowment3) increases for all futures contracts already listed; 2) Demand decreases for all
futures contracts already listed; 3) An increase in the aggregate demand across the futures
contracts already listed; 4) A decrease of the aggregate demand across the futures contracts
already listed; 5) No change of the aggregate demand across the futures already listed.
These five effects are referred to as s rong reinforcement, strong cannibalism, weak
reinforcement, weak cannibalism and neutralism respectively. A futures exchange planning
to list a new futures contract will be interested in finding out which of the above effects will
                                                          
3 Measuring successful commodity derivative innovations is a complicated matter. The critical
success levels for trading volume is necessarily arbitrary. A difficulty with volume data is that
contracts for different commodities are not worth the same amount of money so that the
economic significance of total volume across different contracts is unclear. Duff e a d J ckson
(1989) address this ambiguity by defining the optimal futures contract as the one contributing the
most to the unhedged portion of investors’ endowment.
9occur. Using the multi-product hedging model we are able to provide insight into the level
of reinforcement or cannibalism respectively.
Myers and Thompson (1989) show that the hedge ratio in the univariate case can be
estimated using a simple least squares regression of the spot prices on the futures prices.
Under the assumption that the spot and futures prices are conditionally bivariate in
distribution, they show that the regression coefficient associated with the futures price is a
maximum likelihood estimate of SS fs-1ff  and hence of the optimal hedge ratios (see
equation 4).4 This result is extended to the multi-product hedging case. We shall elaborate
on the implications of these results in order to predict the effect of introducing a new futures
contract on the already listed ones. Note that hedgers are not interested in discovering linear
connections, but rather in finding optimal hedge ratios. When a regression coefficient is
close to zero and non-significant, hedgers will not include in their portfolio that associated
futures contract. The regression coefficients indicate variables of behavior, and we assume
hedgers behave in accordance with them. Subsequently, we use these regression coefficients
to deduce the level of reinforcement or cannibalism.
Suppose we have a matrix F and S of observations of the futures prices f ¢  and spot prices
's  respectively. Now, consider regressing the values of the fixed spot position ,b  bS  on
the futures prices F:
                                                          
4 The maximum likelihood estimates of SS fs-1ff  can be obtained by using the iterated Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach. In the case where the same set of variables explains both
the spot and futures prices, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is also the maximum
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e+F = S fb (5)
where f  is the vector of regression coefficients and  is the vector of residuals. Applying
OLS to (6) yields:
( ) bf SFFF = -1 ¢¢ˆ (6)
and
( )( )bSFFFF-S = e -1 ¢¢ˆ (7)
where (6) is an estimator of the optimal hedge amount   HP sf-1ff bSS=  and thus describes
hedging behavior.
In order to estimate the level of reinforcement induced by a new futures contract type we
define the vector kˆ  and rˆ  as the OLS estimates following from regressing the new futures
contract’s price z on the other futures’ prices:
r.+F =z k (8)
Applying OLS to (8) yields the estimates:
                                                                                                                                                                            
likelihood estimator. In this paper, the results are derived from within the framework of the OLS
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( ) zFFF = -1 ¢¢kˆ (9)
and
.)(ˆ 1 zFFFFzr ¢¢-= - (10)
In order to analyze the influence that this new futures contract has on the original futures
positions, we compare (5) with the estimates of the coefficients in its extended equivalent:
mdgb +z+F = S (11)
where m  is the error term. Applying OLS to (11) yields:
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It can be shown that the coefficient estimator dˆ  equals:
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Note that 0ˆˆ ³¢rr and that FHP)+(Sz = )SF)FFF(z-z( = Sr -1 bbb ¢¢¢¢¢¢ˆ  is a consistent
estimator of FHP)+scov(z,b . Actually, it is a consistent estimator of the covariance
                                                                                                                                                                            
estimator. Using the SUR framework would not affect our conclusions.
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between z and P , the profit (as defined in equation 2). Since kˆ is an OLS estimator, it
holds that 0ˆ' =rF . Therefore we can rewrite (11) as:
.ˆˆˆˆˆˆ dmdkgb r++)+F(=S (14)
The incremental change in the optimal hedging position of the futures contracts already in
the portfolio is thus given as:
.ˆˆˆˆˆˆ dkgffg  = - = )(--- = HPD (15)
If the difference in (15) is all positive for outputs and negative for inputs, strong
reinforcement occurs. If this difference is all negative for outputs and positive for inputs, we
are confronted with strong cannibalism. We can now derive the conditions necessary for
strong reinforcement to occur.
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Proposition. Adding a new futures contract z to the portfolio leads to strong reinforcement
if and only if one of the two following situations applies:
1) The relation between the new futures price z and the original futures prices, as expressed
by the multiple regression coefficients kˆ  is negative for all inputs and positive for all
outputs and .0),cov( <Pz
2) The relation between z and the original futures prices, as expressed by the multiple
regression coefficients kˆ  is positive for all inputs and negative for all outputs and
.0),cov( >Pz
The proposition could be defined for separate futures contracts already listed as well.
Table 1 summarizes our finding.
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TABLE 1. Strong Reinforcement and Strong Cannibalism by Additional Futures
Contract z.
kˆ  negative for inputs
kˆ  positive for outputs
kˆ  positive for inputs
kˆ  negative for outputs
0),cov( <Pz Strong reinforcementStrong cannibalism
0),cov( >Pz Strong cannibalism Strong reinforcement
15
From Table 1 it becomes clear that strong reinforcement/strong cannibalism is dependent on
the regression coefficients of the price of the new futures type on the prices of the futures
already in the portfolio, kˆ  and on the covariance between the futures price of the new
futures contract and the profit, i.e. the return on the portfolio.5
By looking at the absolute value of the elements in the vector (15), we are able to pronounce
weak reinforcement and weak cannibalism. When the sum of the elements in this
transformed vector is positive (without all the individual elements being positive, which
would imply strong reinforcement), w  speak of weak reinforcement. When the sum of the
elements in the vector is negative (again, without all the individual elements being negative,
which would imply strong cannibalism), we speak of weak cannibalism.
A key aspect of futures market performance is the degree of liquidity in the market. The
relationship between market depth and futures contract success has been thoroughly
investigated in the literature (Black (1986), Cuny (1993)). A futures market is considered
liquid if traders and participants can buy or sell futures contracts quickly with little price
effect resulting from their transactions. However, in thin markets transactions of individual
hedgers may have significant price effects and result in substantial transaction costs. The
introduction of a new futures contract can, for example, turn one liquid futures contract into
                                                          
5 It should be noted that futures contract price is an unknown before the introduction of the new
futures contract. However, in an empirical application, the spot market price of the new futures
contract’s underlying commodity may be used, it being an accurate approximation of the
development of the futures contract price.
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two illiquid contracts. This liquidity effect, or better stated lack of liquidity, can be
incorporated in our model by correcting the futures market price for liquidity costs. In this
way, we calculate the net futures price, which equals the futures price minus the liquidity
costs. The stochastics of the net futures price is made up of the variance of the futures price,
the variance of liquidity costs and the covariance between liquidity costs and the futures
price. So, whenever we suspect a thin futures market, because of small trading volume or
the absence of scalpers on the floor to absorb temporary order imbalances, we use the net
futures price instead of the quoted futures price. In the next section we present an example
of a relatively thin futures market where we use the net futures price.
IV. Empirical Illustration
In this section, we illustrate the respective effect of reinforcement and cannibalism on the
soybean complex traded at the Chicago Board of Trade and the financial futures spread
traded at the Amsterdam Exchanges. Soybean processors have at their disposal three futures
contracts relevant to their production process, which consists of crushing soybeans (major
input) into soy oil and soy meal (major outputs). The production process has fixed
input/output ratios of 47 pounds of meal and 11 pounds of oil per bushel of beans.
Estimates of the optimal hedge amounts for the three futures contracts are made using
futures prices for the nearby contract month. We calculate the optimal hedging amounts of
soybeans, oil and meal for a soybean crusher who is planning to process one bushel of
soybeans into 11.19 pounds of oil and 0.02397 tons of meal. Daily spot (Central Illinois)
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and futures prices for the period January 1990 through December 1997 were obtained from
the Chicago Board of Trade.
First, we estimate the optimal hedge amounts for the univariate case, the model that does
not take into account the cross effects and the indirect effects by regr ssing the spot prices
on the futures prices. Next, we estimate the separate hedge amounts for the scenario in
which the entrepreneur wishes to hedge/cover profit fluctuations instead of price risk, as the
univariate case presupposes. For this reason, we calculate the gross profit from the
production process, by determining the spot value of the processor’s endowment (i.e., the
soybean crush spread, or margin) based on the fixed input/output structure of the soybean
processor. Regressing the gross profit on the futures prices then enables us to estimate the
optimal hedge amount.6
                                                          
6 A common concern in the hedging literature is whether lag variables should be included in the
regression. Myers and Thompson (1989) noted that a model that does not include lags might
provide poor estimates because it omits important conditioning information relevant to the means
of both the cash and futures prices. We estimated the regression with and without lags (following
the procedure of Britten-Jones (1999). Including the lags did not make much difference for the
optimal hedge ratios and hence, the results regarding reinforcement and cannibalism. This is in
line with the recent findings of Ferguson and Dean (1998). In the paper we present the results
without the lags.
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TABLE 2. Optimal Hedge Amounts for Single Commodities and Different Hedging
Motives.
Optimal hedge amountsa
Motivation for Soybeans (SB) Soy oil (SO) Soy meal (SM) 
Hedging: reduce
spot price risk 1.019 11.861 0.028
profit risk 0.076 4.239 0.004
(residual risk)
Assume the soybean crusher’s endowment is 1 bushel of soybeans, 11.19 pounds of soy oil and 0.02397 tons of
soy meal.  All the standard errors from the estimated coefficients were smaller than 0.01.
aHedging amounts are in bushels for soybeans, pounds of oil and tons for meal.
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Table 2 shows that less hedging occurs when the hedging motivation is reduction of the
firm’s residual risk than when the objective is reduction of a single commodity’s spot price
risk (here and elsewhere the absolute value of the hedge amounts are displayed). Our
findings, which suggest lower hedging levels necessitated in profit risk management, can be
explained through the presence of natural hedges in the soybean crush, that is to say, a
positive correlation between the spot prices of inputs and outputs, which reduces the need
for hedging. These results support somewhat that of Tzang and Leuthold (1990).
Using the multi-product hedging model, the optimal hedge amounts are estimated for a
scenario in which the exchange would list either soybeans, soy oil or soy meal only (see
Table 3). These hedge amounts are equal to the optimal hedge amounts in Table 2 for the
case where profit risk management constitutes the motivation for hedging. Subsequently,
we are able to investigate the hedge amounts and reinforcement-cannibalism levels of a
total of seven different combinations of futures contract listings by regressing the gross
profit from the crush on the futures prices (see Table 3).
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TABLE 3. Optimal Hedge Amounts for Different Combinations of Futures
Contracts.
Optimal hedge amountsa
Listing Soybeans (SB) Soy oil (SO)     Soy meal (SM) HEb
SB 0.076 * * 4.0%
SO * 4.239 * 14.4%
SM * * 0.004 13.6%
SB and SO 0.000 4.035 * 14.6%
SB and SM 0.359 * 0.013 26.7%
SO and SM * 3.489 0.003 22.9%
SB, SO and SM 0.885 9.907 0.003 72.6%
Assume the soybean crusher’s endowment is 1 bushel of soybeans, 11.19 pounds of soy oil and 0.02397 tons of
soy meal.  All the standard errors from the estimated coefficients were smaller than 0.01.
aHedging amounts are in bushels for soybeans, pounds of oil and tons for meal.
bThe hedging effectiveness (HE) is measured as the percentage reductions in variances relative to the unhedged
position (Ederington (1979)).
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Table 3 shows that listing all three contracts realize an optimum. That is, the aggregate
demand for the hedging services provided by the futures exchange is maximized. In that
case for each bushel of soybeans the processors plan to purchase and crush, th ir
endowment is 1 bushel short for soybeans, 11.19 pounds long soy oil and 0.02397 tons long
soy meal, the risk minimizing multivariate hedge is to go long 0.885 bushels of soybeans,
short 9.907 pounds of soy oil and short 0.003 tons of soy meal. In this situation the hedging
effectiveness will reaches an optimum as well.
When adding soy oil to soybeans, strong cannibalism occurs. That is, the optimal hedge
amount for soybeans decreases. However, when adding soy meal to soybeans and soy oil,
strong reinforcement occurs. That is, the hedge amounts of the futures already listed
(soybeans and soy oil) increase by adding soy meal. This is evident from proposition 1 as
well. The regression of soy meal on the prices of the futures already in the portfolio, kˆ  in
Equation (15), is negative and the covariance between the futures price of the new futures
contract, in our case soy meal, and the profit, i.e., the return on the portfolio, is positive.
This puts us in the lower-right quadrant of Table 1, strong reinforcement. This example
illustrates why an exchange would have interest in studying the whole production structure
of the potential hedger. Listing only part of a production structure may imply a sub-optimal
situation for the exchange.
Now we turn to an example of a relatively thin futures market. A pension fund has several
possibilities to cover its risks resulting from fluctuations in interest rates. One way to hedge
against adverse interest rate changes is to hedge with the help of a bond futures contract. In
22
the Netherlands, however, this contract was not successful and was de-listed. At the
Amsterdam Exchanges (AEX) the following relevant futures contracts are being traded: the
AEX stock index (which consists of Dutch blue chip stocks), the Dutch top-5 index, the
FTSE Europe top-100 stock index (which include European blue chip stocks) and the US
Dollar/Dutch Guilder futures contract. The AEX stock index was introduced on 24 October
1989, the Dutch top-5 index futures on 21 March 1990, the FTSE Europe top-100 index
futures on 6 June 1991 and the US Dollar futures on 27 September 1991. Pension funds that
wish to hedge against adverse interest rates on the Dutch Guilder have at their disposal four
futures contracts traded at Amsterdam Exchanges. Contrary to the futures from the soybean
complex at the Chicago Board of Trade, the market for these futures at the Amsterdam
Exchanges is rather thin. The volume of the AEX stock index in 1997 was 2,554,776
contracts, the Dutch top-5 index was 58,891, the FTSE Europe top-100 index was 249, and
the US dollar futures was 19,914. Because we suspect that a trader incurs liquidity costs
when trading these thin futures, we incorporated these costs. In order to calculate the
liquidity costs and hence, the net futures price, we gathered daily transaction-specific data
for the period 1992 through 1997. In the case of order selling imbalance, liquidity costs
were calculated as the area between the downward-sloping price path and the price for
which the hedger enters the futures market, hence
å
=
-= ×
N
i
iPFNPFLC
1
1 )( (16)
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where 1PF  is the futures price for which the hedger enters the market, iPF is the price
of the i-th futures contract and N the total order flow.
The liquidity costs in the case of order buying imbalance were calculated as the area
between the upward-sloping price path and the price for which the hedger enters the
futures market, hence
.)( 1
1
NPFPFLC
N
i
i ×-= å
=
(17)
The net futures price is now calculated as the quoted futures price minus the liquidity
costs per futures contract. In further analyses we use these net futures prices.
We now calculate the optimal hedging amounts of a holder of one million Dutch Guilders.
The dependent variable in the regression is the yield on a 10-year Dutch Treasury bond. In
estimating the optimal hedge amounts and hedging effectiveness of different combinations
of futures, we use the same actual sequence which was used by the Amsterdam Exchanges,
that is we first estimated the optimal hedging amount when only the AEX stock index is
available, followed by the Dutch top-5 index, the FTSE Europe top-100 index and finally
the US Dollar contract.
24
Table 4 reflects the optimal hedge amounts and hedging effectiveness of the different
futures.7 It shows that the addition of the Dutch top-5 index to the AEX index leads to
strong reinforcement, that is the hedging d ma d for the AEX index has increased from
34.45 to 80.56 due to the listing of the Dutch top-5 index. Adding the FTSE Europe top-100
index leads also to weak reinforcement. The introduction of the FTSE Europe top-100
index leads to a decrease for AEX index futures and an increase for Dutch top-5 index
futures, which finds its reflection in the change of the optimal hedging amounts. Table 4
shows that listing the US Dollar futures contract leads to weak cannibalism. The
introduction of the US Dollar futures leads to a decrease for both the AEX index futures and
the FTSE Europe top-100 index futures. This decrease is not fully offset by the increase in
the Dutch top-5 index futures.
In the above analysis, the liquidity costs have been taken into account. In order to
investigate the effect of thin markets on reinforcement and cannibalism, we performed the
analysis again, this time without calculating the liquidity as indicated in equations (16)
and (17). These results show no major changes in the conclusions about reinforcement
and cannibalism. They do show increased hedging effectiveness for the various
combinations, which also overrates hedging effectiveness in each case (about three
percent) because of excluding liquidity costs. These results correspond to the findings of
Pennings and Meulenberg (1997). The fact that the extent of the lack of liquidity is not
very severe, and the fact that it does not differ much between the contracts, might explain
the lack of finding any major effects in this analysis. In another empirical setting,
                                                          
7 Each of the four futures contracts is designed such that a one-point change in the quotation
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however, major differences in reinforcement and cannibalism might very well be found
when the incorporation of liquidity risk in the analysis is omitted. For this reason, it is
advisable to incorporate the liquidity component into the model, whenever a lack of
liquidity is expected.
These two examples show to an exchange the value of studying the effects that individual
contracts may have on other contracts listed. Paying attention to the structure of the residual
risk of its potential customers can prove valuable to the exchange. This implies that the
exchange should investigate the underlying production structure of the hedger’s industry,
and by doing so identify the residual risk.
V. Managerial Implications
Our findings carry important implications for a futures exchange’s innovation policy.
Before introducing a new futures contract, it is important for a futures exchange to study
first the effects of such an introduction on those futures contracts already listed.
Disregarding the possibility of cannibalism when introducing a new futures contract might
lead to a volume decrease for those futures contracts currently traded. This volume decrease
might, in turn, lead to a decline in liquidity, which would ultimately threaten the exchange’s
viability.
                                                                                                                                                                            
implies a change of the underlying value of the futures contract of 200 Dutch Guilders.
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 In view of this, it is valuable for an exchange to investigate the hedger’s underlying
production structure, that is, the firm’s residual spot market risk before introducing new
futures contracts. A futures exchange should conduct research in order to introduce only
futures contracts that will actually realize (strong/weak) reinforcement, thus ensuring its
own success.
 
 These results gain special relevance when applied to new futures exchanges because of
their smaller scale (Kilcollin and Frankel (1993)). For these exchanges, volume
sufficiency is of vital importance. Through a thoughtful strategy of new introductions, an
exchange should be able to generate a volume increase for the futures contracts already
listed, thereby automatically increasing its over-all viability and, by doing so, increasing
contract liquidity. Moreover, such an exchange would be better equipped to comply with
the demands of companies wanting to hedge their profits. When carrying out an
innovation, it would be advisable that this exchange take into account the liquidity costs
of the existing futures contracts, since a lack of liquidity may have an effect on
reinforcement.
 
 Listing futures contracts that reflect the residual spot market risk of the hedger’s industry
would be advantageous to the clearing system of futures contracts that are subject to
margining. A combination of futures contracts reflecting the production structure (and
hence, the residual spot market risk) keeps margin requirements at a lower level than they
would be if all futures contracts were listed separately (Goldberg and Hach y (1992),
Gemmill (1994)). This creates an opportunity for the hedger to free-up more capital and
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hence, the possibility of enlarging futures contracts positions whenever the capital
requirement is the limiting factor in taking positions. Cross margining between exchange-
traded futures contracts is an option offered by some clearing houses in conjunction with
futures contracts reflecting the production structure.
Gathering information on the production structures particular to different industries seems
to be of great importance to futures exchanges. Computer technology and advancements in
telecommunications will make this easier in the future, which will, in turn, lead to
improvements in the structure of futures exchanges (Merton (1995)).
VI. Conclusion
This paper introduces a method that yields information about the effect of introducing new
futures contracts. This method can be easily applied by futures exchanges. However, some
caveats in our analyses should be mentioned. First, our analysis is derived from a multi-
product hedging model in which the spot positions were fixed. However, as Anderson and
Danthine (1981) showed decreasing the residual risk for the hedger will lead to an increase
in the optimal production level, which in turns leads to an increase in the scale of hedging.
Since adding a new futures contract that reflects the underlying production structure of the
hedger will decrease residual risk, this effect will induce reinforcement and offset
cannibalism, at least partially. Second, we did not account for the effect of redistributing
liquidity, that is, the effect of redistributing liquidity from highly liquid futures contracts to
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relatively illiquid futures contracts due to the introduction of a new futures contract, which
may increase the attractiveness of the futures exchange and hence its success.
Our findings suggest several directions for further research. First, including the demand for
speculation might extend our framework. Listing futures contracts reflecting the production
structure of the hedger’s industry will increase spreading opportunities, which might
increase the attractiveness of the futures exchange for speculators and hence, contribute to
its success. Second, the competitive environment of the exchange will have an impact on
reinforcement and cannibalism. Modeling these competitive forces within the framework,
as proposed here, is an avenue of future exploration.
Table 4. Optimal Hedge Amounts for Different Combinations of Futures Contracts.
Optimal hedge amounts
Listing AEX-index (FTI) Dutch top-5 index (FT5) FTSE Europe top-100 index (FET)US dollar futures (FUS)
HEa
FTI 34.45 * * *
50.8%
FT5 * 20.07 * *
45.1%
FET * * 16.96 *
54.5%
FUS * * * 263.51
15.3%
FTI and FT5 80.56 28.98 * *
53.8%
FTI, FT5 and FET 64.11 66.85 97.91 *
70.2%
FTI, FT5, FET and FUS 41.51 76.77 92.95 123.48
72.5%
All the standard errors from the estimated coefficients were smaller than 0.01.
a The hedging effectiveness (HE) is measured as the percentage reductions in variances relative to the unhedged position (Ederington, 1979).
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